Thank you very much, Steve.

First, about some of the points that Tom Campbell made earlier,

and some of the things that we have been having to endure from

the media as of late, and just to reaffirm, those of us who are elected

by our constituents believe that our Constitution requires that

the Congress play a significant role in determining foreign policy,

especially the involving of the United States of America in a war.

Clearly the founders of our Republic wanted the Congress to be involved

in that and did not see that the President of the United

States as an individual had the powers of a king in engaging the

new country or the United States of America in a war.

We had gotten through that, and we spent hundreds of years

under the rule of a king, and that is not what we have now. During

the Cold War we permitted certain leeway and certain centralization

of power to happen in the United States of America, and the

Cold War is over. I think this is the process, what we see now, and

some of the friction going on is a process in the shaking out and

the redistribution of that power again after the Cold War.

Now, on to some specifics, and I am sorry I was not here earlier.

I am the Chairman of the Space and Aeronautics Committee, and

I had an important hearing about the implications of Y2K on our

space program and whether or not there will be some major problems.

But as the Chairman of that Subcommittee, I have been

deeply involved with the effort to cooperate with our former enemies

in Russia who are now our potential friends in the space effort.

Let me ask you this: I was not here to hear you say this, but is

it my understanding that you suggested that Russia is not involved

in proliferating weapons, missiles and other technology?

Fine. Because I heard another Member make

a suggestion that you had indicated that.

Now as to this situation in the Balkans, from

what I understand, Curt Weldon, when he went there with the delegation

of the Members of Congress to negotiate with the members

of the Duma, reached a compromise solution with the members of

the Duma and were about to underscore the importance of that

kind of cooperation when they were informed that they should not

go to Serbia and to Belgrade because Jesse Jackson’s mission had

been a failure and that the prisoners were not going to be released,

and thus they were encouraged by the Administration to abort that

part of their plan which was to go forward together, members of

the Duma and Congress, to Belgrade, receive the prisoners, and announce

to the world that there is an option that we have reached

some sort of a potential breakthrough for a peace proposal.

Why did the Administration suggest to Congressman Weldon

that the prisoners were not going to be released and try to discourage

him from going to Belgrade?

So your answer is that the Administration

did not discourage Mr. Weldon.

I understand from Mr. Weldon that they had

agreed after negotiations with the Duma that Russians could

agree, and the Serbians who were present said that this would

probably be acceptable and were on the telephone in communications

with Mr. Milosevic, that instead of having NATO peace keepers

as we were demanding, they would accept non-NATO peace

keepers, the United Nations peace keepers, and they would be

armed, and there would be autonomy for Kosovo. Just from a distance,

it appears that the Administration is moving toward that position

at this moment.

Is this correct? I mean, are we moving toward the point where

we could now accept,—instead of the NATO peace keepers, U.N.

peace keepers as Mr. Weldon negotiated in Vienna?